Would Proportional Representation Strengthen the Republic

Charles Anderson

Would Proportional Representation Strengthen the Republic?

America, the world’s second oldest Republic, is one of the few democracies that still use the traditional single-winner system to determine the outcome of its elections. Most of Europe, as well as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Israel employ some form of fully proportional or semi-proportional representation in their voting. Proportional Representation (PR) is roughly defined as, “a group of voting systems whose major goal is to ensure that parties and political groups are allocated seats in legislative bodies in proportion to their share of the vote, [i.e.] a party receiving 30% of the national vote should receive 30% of the seats in the legislature” (PR Library, 2001). In the UK and in Canada the debate over whether or not to fully embrace PR is ongoing. Should America jump on board with this popular idea too? Is there enough proof of PR’s efficiency for us to abandon what we’ve always done? Despite cries that winner-take-all isn’t “fair” enough, the arguments for a complete withdrawal from our conventional system aren’t sound enough. For the most part, they seem to legitimize any notion, so long as no one person’s notions count more than another person’s (Graber, 1996). In 1788, James Madison spoke of the “ascendancy of passion over reason” in political decision-making, and that’s what a lot of the arguments for PR really amount to. They offer a lot of conjecture and circumstantial evidence in favor of PR, but no real concrete justification for abandoning our current system.

Under the American winner-take-all system, when the populace goes to the polls they cast one vote per-person for one candidate per-position. The candidate who acquires more votes than any other is elected, regardless of whether or not he or she wins a majority of all votes. Sometimes this

method is called “first-past-the-post” (Types of Electoral Systems, 1999). It’s simple to understand, the person who convinces the largest group of people to vote for him wins. The winner is then however, responsible for properly representing all of his constituents, not just the ones who share his views. The winner must work, theoretically at least, for the good of the whole, not just for his group. Suppose that a plurality winner enters her state legislature with 47 percent of the popular vote, having upset a frontrunner who got 46 percent, and a third candidate who caught 7 percent. That new representative is very mindful that she isn’t the favorite of the majority. She will do everything possibly to gratify everyone, for the reason that she needs to lure scores of voters if she hopes to be reelected. She will actually be aware that she lacks a popular mandate, and act accordingly. That is the positive aspect of a single winner majority-driven republic (Bain, 1999).

In contrast, there are several models of PR in use. Most notably there’s preference voting. Specifically it’s called single-transferable-vote. Voters signify their order of preference amongst different candidates. Candidates whose “first-choice” totals attain a winning quota are elected. The last-place candidate is removed, and the left over “second-choice” votes are added to the totals of the remaining runners. The procedure is repeated until all seats are filled (Types of Electoral Systems, 1999). Second, there’s limited voting. In limited voting either the voter must cast less votes than the amount of seats up for bid or, in a partisan election such as a primary, each party is obligated to nominate fewer candidates than the number of open seats (Richie, 1998). Third there’s party list voting. Voters simply choose between parties, and seats are given in proportion to the number of votes obtained by each party. Candidates are then seated in the order of votes they received (Types of Electoral Systems, 1999). Finally there’s cumulative voting, in which voters cast multiple votes for one or more candidates. They can distribute votes in any way they want, including uneven numbers of votes for different candidates, or all votes for one candidate (Richie, 1998).

The basis behind support for Proportional Representation is idea that groups of “like-minded” individuals deserve easier access to seats in legislatures; in proportion to the fraction of the popular vote they receive (Richie, 1998, p. 1). Those who champion the call for change, claim that PR creates more representative legislators and that it produces better public policy (Hill, & Richie, 1999). In particular, it’s said that people will no longer waste their votes on loosing candidates, that extra diversity will cause lawmakers to work better together, and that all ideas will be equally embraced. It’s said too, that the winner-take-all rules are “antiquated” and that they weaken the accountability of those elected. Advocates also argue that the fundamental “fairness” of PR will “level the playing field” (Richie, 1998, p. 1, 6).

First of all, people do not “waste” their votes by choosing a candidate who doesn’t win. Those who say otherwise are sore losers. The only way a vote gets “wasted” is if a person simply doesn’t render one. One person gets one vote, with which to express his or her political opinion. “One-vote, one-value” (Graber, 1996, p. 1) means exactly what it sounds like; it’s not one or multiple votes of variable weight in the name of “fairness.” Oddly, PR dose, according to its supporter’s rhetoric, deliver “wasted” votes. Suppose that voters are given six candidates to rank in order of preference. If a voter feels inclined toward one candidate and apathetic or hostile toward the others, she or he can vote for that one candidate alone, ensuring that the favorite gets a vote and that the others do not. If the favorite candidate is not elected, his or her vote, according to PR policy, is wasted after all. But above all, the most obviously apparent way for PR to end up with “wasted” votes is for people to vote aimlessly down a long line up of candidates after picking their first choice. That in fact reflects random chance more than any sort of preference (Bain, 1999).

Furthermore, could municipalities even begin to be able to count proportional votes? Could a system that ranks candidates in sequence; assigning victors in proportion to the share of votes they received work (Bain, 1999)? Bob Richie, of the Center for Voting and Democracy, acknowledges that PR ballot counting is complicated. In 1998 he explained that to agree on winners, PR vote counting systems must establish a formula for determining the quantity of votes required for a candidate to receive office based on the number of seats and ballots. In a race to fill three seats, for instance, the winning quota would be “one vote more than 25 percent of the total;” a sum that would not be mathematically possible for four candidates to attain. After counting first choice selections, contenders with the winning quota would be elected. “Surplus” ballots beyond the winning quota would be transferred to the remaining candidates in accordance to the voter’s “next-choice preferences.” In the most defined scheme, each ballot would be transferred at an “equally reduced value.” After transferring the “surplus” ballots, the candidate with the least votes would be removed. All of that candidate’s ballots would then be redistributed between the remaining candidates, according to voter’s “next-choice preferences.” He says then that, this progression is continued until all seats are filled. All in all, a system of progressing through first-choices and second-choices, and redistributing other choices seems kind of unpredictable. It certainly doesn’t sound more sure fire than ballot counting now.

Next, PR is not more productive than winner-take-all, in fact it may be less so. The belief that a wider diversification of views will somehow produce productive coalitions is preposterous. Under Israel’s proportional system, for example, no one ever wins a majority. The election is always followed by months of endless coalition and alliance making. Public policy takes a back burner to a series of legislative compromises and inter-party courtships (Voting for, 2003). In Italy, PR permits even minute parties to have enough power to defeat an unsteady alliance and to halt legislation. Majority parties are often left weak to the disproportionate power wielded by the over 18 smaller parties (Low Voter Turnout, 1999). This being said, if PR dose anything, it encourages more issue-oriented parties (Graber, 1996). This is true, however it wouldn’t necessarily bring representatives together, but would instead cause major splits between clearly defined ideological differences. If the U.S.’s two major parties, which qualify all their stances, can still hardly come to terms now, how on earth would numerous small parties with real defined positions accomplish work together? Plus, if PR’s aim is to have more productive “authentic” representatives, then it stands to reason that for every “authentic” representative on one end of the political spectrum, there would be another on the opposite end. Is it not likely that advocates of Diversity would simply be opposed and countered by advocates of uniformity?

Moreover, the realistic consequences of electoral methods that seek to give every citizen equal legislative persuasion usually turns out to be less progressive than hoped. Whereas winner-take-all generally ensures that the political center will control public policy, polls suggest that PR is much more likely to augment the overall political strength of extremists rather than centrists. Perhaps the average American might have some more open-minded ideas than the average Republican Senator, but to say that American social policies would become much more progressive solely because all voters have a “fair” influence on the making of those policies is absurd. In addition, if another goal of PR is to have representatives who won’t diverge from their constituent’s interests, it stands to reason that the same force which tethers “authentic” positive representatives to their constituents in all likelihood would bind “authentic” negative representatives to their radical constituents. Instituting a system that blindly maximizes the encouragement for elected officials to become “delegates rather than to be trustees” would, for these rationales, capitulate no more, if not less, social equality than we have presently (Graber, 1996, p. 2-3)

Subsequently, Champions of PR argue that under the winner-take-all system, representatives do not represent their constituent’s diversity adequately (Evans & Oleszek, 1998); and that PR would

“harness representatives to the interests of their constituents” (Graber, 1996, p 2). This is not necessarily a good thing. James Madison said that law making should not hinge on “preference aggression” and “bargaining among interests.” Hamilton believed that republican principals shouldn’t call for an “unqualified compliance” to every impulsive “breeze of passion.” Nor did he think the Republic should be subject to each fleeting impulse which citizens might be given from men who “flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.” In their writing, both men encouraged political bodies to try to curtail the force of any type of prejudice on public policy, not to institute the premise that prejudices should be equally represented (Graber, 1996, p. 3-4).

Finally, “fair representation for all” (Hill, & Richie, 1999) translates to mean that voters shouldn’t be politically liable. Saying, no one is responsible for their own political ideas, because the parties aren’t “fair.” No one is responsible perusing his or her political beliefs, because the representation method isn’t “fair.” Voters aren’t responsible for low-voter-turnouts, because the system isn’t “fair.” Unlimited “fairness” diminishes the amount of responsibility placed on the individual, basically saying that voters can have it all and not make any political trade offs. Supporting PR, Rep. Cynthia McKinney said in 1995:

In a multi-member district, voters would have more than one representative to elect and more than one vote to cast. Hence, if a voter liked one candidate's position on abortion and another candidate's position on taxes, he or she could vote for both and conceivably see both of their choices selected.

What its supporters really mean is that PR permits people to assert their political values without any concessions between priorities. Writing about democracy, Fredrick Hayek said in 1944:

The periodical election of representatives, to which the moral choice of the individual tends to be more and more reduced, is [now] not an occasion on which his moral values are tested or

where he has constantly to reassert and prove the order of his values and to testify to the sincerity of his profession by the sacrifice of those of his values he rates lower to those he puts higher (233).

Instead of telling voters that they are responsible for putting their most important standards first, despite the cost, PR tells them that the system should be more “fair.” That they should be able to have everything they want; that they can have their cake, and eat it at the same time.

All things considered, PR supporters need to carefully study public opinion and public priorities if they hope to determine the probable impact of preferred voting schemes on electoral and legislative decision-making (Graber, 1996) because now, they simply don’t know. Until then, elections are competitive events and should be treated as such. Mr. Richie said in a 1998 article that, “everybody wins” is the logic behind PR; this statement is inherently illogical though. For anyone to win, someone logically has to “not win,” i.e. loose. Besides, the U.S. is a Republic founded on the principal of majority rule. This isn’t Athens, flooded by the sound of every man shouting his opinion and proclaiming the newest hysteria-of-the-day, knowing that the loudest voice wins. Not everyone can win, nor can all voices be heard. That’s the flaw with PR, the irritating premise that winning is a universal right, and the assumption that everyone’s random viewpoints should be considered equally important. Some views are simply outlandish and contrary to the mainstream, which is precisely why people espousing them don’t often get elected. The belief that true fairness requires nothing short of proportional representation (Diversity or, 2002) isn’t enough to launch a major onslaught against the winner-take-all system.

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